Russian-Baltic Relations, Three Different Cases

 		 
    Considering the history and the geographic position of the Baltic states it is quite natural that even present-day Russia plays an important role in the area, both in inter-Baltic cooperation and in Baltic-Western relations. The first years, after the three Baltic republics became independent and the Soviet Union fell apart, Russia was forced to deal with the legacy left by the Soviet empire. The new Russian Federation took on the Soviet legacy because it wanted to be a continuation of the old empire, thereby hoping to keep the advantages of being a super power, but Russia was left with an enormous amount of problems as well. In the case of the Baltic countries the most pressing issues were the withdrawal of the former Soviet troops, the large Russian speaking minorities in the area and the settlement of the border questions. In the beginning Russia, along with the rest of the world, treated the Baltic states as an entity. However the problems created by the Soviet legacy were not the same in all the Baltic states and the foreign and economic policies of each country took markedly different directions following independence. As a consequence Russia, as well as Europe, began to look upon and treat the three Baltic countries as separate cases.(Sakwa 1993, pp. 337-345; The subject was also treated in Alex Pravda€s course €Soviet and Post-Soviet Foreign Policy€, Autumn term 1997)

 
   

Estonia

 
    In the Estonian case the biggest problem the Soviet legacy left behind in the independent state, was the large Russian speaking population (30% of the titular population), artificially implanted on its territory during the Soviet regime, to work in the factories. In an attempt to secure the rights of the titular nationality, the government of the newly independent republic of Estonia revived the citizenship law of 1938, granting automatic citizenship only to the citizens of the interwar republic and their decendants. Thereby excluding the Russians who were moved to the former Estonian republic after the war, as well as their decendants, from automatically getting Estonian citizenship. Anyone who had been resident for two years or more could apply for citizenship, but had to pass a written and an oral test in the Estonian language first. Even though the Russian population had been living in Estonia for many decades they had not been forced to learn Estonian during the Soviet regime and were now suddenly faced with learning a quite difficult language. The result was that 42% of the Estonian population of 1.6 million, mostly Russians, were not allowed to vote in the elections of 20 September 1992. In Russia the issue was played up by the national-patriots, as a significant human rights violation by the Estonian government towards its large Russian speaking minority. The citizenship law thus became a great challenge to Yeltsin€s liberal policies towards the former Soviet Union republics, and a stumbling block in Estonian relations with Russia, leading to unaccounted for problems in Estonia€s relations with the west as well.(Sakwa 1993, pp. 337-340)

 
    From the Estonian, as well as from the two other Baltic states€ point of view the most urgent issue to be dealt with upon regaining their independence was the fast removal of the 125 000 former Soviet troops (25 000 in Estonia) still left on their territory at the end of 1991. For Russia this part of the Soviet legacy presented a major problem, as there were over a million former Soviet forces stationed in all the successor republics after the break-up of the Soviet Union. The Russian-Baltic negotiations on the withdrawal of the troops became nerve-racking as the schedule was prolonged from the first date set by the Baltic republics; complete withdrawal by 1 December 1991, to the more realistic; by the end of 1992, while the Russians maintained that they would only be able to remove the troops by 1994. The Baltic states called the continued stay of the former Soviet forces on foreign territory, a violation of international law, while Russia justified the delay by stressing the problem of logistics and insisting on a ordered withdrawal of the troops. Neither the Russian nor the Baltic side would face up to realities and try to come to some sort of agreement acceptable to both.(Ibid, pp. 343-345)

 
    Regarding this issue, Russia had been negotiating with the three Baltic countries as a single unit, but from mid 1992 onwards Russia started to view the three Baltic states as separate cases to the advantage of Lithuania. The Russian negotiations with Estonia, as well as with Latvia, froze, as Russia linked the question of civic rights violations towards the Russian speaking minorities in both countries to the delay in the withdrawal of their troops. The result was that the former Soviet troops were completely withdrawn from Estonia and Latvia by the summer of 1994, a whole year later than in the Lithuanian case.(Ibid, pp. 344-345; Helsingin Sanomat 24.10.1997)

 
    Another problem, unfortunately still on the agenda, is the border question, neither Estonia nor Latvia has been able to reach a border settlement with Russia, although both countries have given up their earlier expressed claims on the territory granted to them by the Soviet Union in the peace settlement 1920. Once again the reason given by Russia for withholding a settlement of the border question, are alleged civic rights violations in Estonia and Latvia. There are of course other probable reasons as well, for leaving the borders unsettled. The most likely reason according to western opinion and the Baltic states themselves is that Russia, by refusing to settle the border question, can make it difficult for Estonia to join the West-European economic and security structures. Since neither the European Union nor NATO accept members who have border disagreements with their neighbours. However Russia is expected to settle its border dispute with Estonia in the near future, because the EU has chosen Estonia to be in the first group of applicants for membership, thereby choosing to regard the border dispute as one-sided.(Sakwa 1993, p. 343; HS 2.10.1997, 24.10.1997, 27.10.1997) So the Russian-Estonian relations are given a brighter future, though the minority and border questions remain unsolved.

 
   

Latvia

 
    Upon gaining its independence on 21 August 1991, Latvia was left with similar problems as Estonia, by the Soviet empire, but the overall magnitude of the burden was even worse in the Latvian case. The Latvian republic had endured the most thorough Sovietisation which brought in over 900 000 Russians to the region, as a result over 1/3 of the small Latvian population of 2.7 million spoke Russian. Following the Estonian example, Latvia adopted strict guidelines on citizenship in the autumn of 1992, only interwar Latvian residents and their descendants were granted automatical citizenship, others had to apply for citizenship. The fact that no clear citizenship laws had been enforced made the situation all the more confusing for the newer residents, consisting of nearly half of the population. The Russian speaking population felt particularly unjustly dicriminated against, since most of them had supported the Latvian demands for independence.(Sakwa 1993, pp. 337-343)

 
    The Latvian economy had also been closely integrated into the Soviet economy, and was therefore especially sensitive to the collapse of the USSR, not even the introduction of a Latvian currency in May 1992 could slow down the escalating inflation, while the standard of living kept on falling. The issue of the former Soviet troops€ withdrawal followed the same lines as in the Estonian case, though even regarding this problem Latvia found itself in a worse position, with about 60 000 troops to deal with alone, nearly the same amount as in the other two Baltic states combined. In the case of the unsettled border question, as in the delayed troop withdrawal, both Latvia and Estonia has had to pay for the hard line they have adopted in dealing with their large Russian speaking minorities. It seems that Latvia still has to bear the heaviest burden left by the Soviet legacy, not only complicating its relations with Russia, but also making it hard for Latvia to gain membership in the international and regional organisations it longs to join.(Ibid; HS 11.7.1997, 27.8.1997, 24.10.1997)

 
   

Lithuania

 
    With its grand history, Lithuania dared as the first of the three Baltic republics to declare itself independent on 11 March 1990, with tough consequenses, the republic was subject to economic sanctions for a period of four months, and a pre-coup in January 1991 in which fifteen people were killed (Sakwa 1993, p. 341). But although Lithuania suffered during the first years of independence, the future of its relations with Russia looked better, than that of the other two Baltic republics.

 
    Whereas the demographic situation worsened Estonian and Latvian relations with Russia and consequently also with the West, Lithuania escaped some of the problems, as it had not been so severely affected by the Soviet legacy. When Lithuania became independent, in late July 1991, only 9% of the entire population of 3.6 million were Russians, a small minority compared to the Estonian and Latvian cases. Naturally the Lithuanians did not feel threatened and the small minority was not discriminated against by any guidelines or laws on citizenship. Lithuania€s relations with Russia were thereby rendered much easier, also making the accession of Lithuania to international organizations speedier and less difficult. Lithuania definitely profited when Russia and the international community in mid 1992 started treating the Baltic states as three separate cases, instead of one unit.(Ibid, pp. 337-345)

 
    Lithuania seems also to be the only one of the three intent on improving its relations with Russia and other former Soviet republics, continuing the more Russia friendly foreign policy from the interwar period. Another parallel to that period can be seen in the country€s strained relations with its Polish minority of 250 000 (over 7% of the whole population). Both Poland and Lithuania have dealt with the issue in peaceful terms.(Ibid, pp. 341-342)

 
    While Lithuania€s fairly good relations with Russia led to the faster withdrawal of the former Soviet forces, they were removed from Lithuania already by August 1993, there was a potential problem in the growing number of troops in the Russian oblast of Kaliningrad. The Kaliningrad region had been an important Soviet military base and continued to have great strategic importance after the collapse of the USSR, as the most Western port in the Russian Federation. Since the Kaliningrad region is separated from the heartland of Russia by Belorus and Lithuania, the landway connection between Russia and Kaliningrad is dependent on these two countries. Though this seems to lend an unfortunate position to Lithuania it has actually played an important part in the good relations between Russia and Lithuania, since Russia needs to guarantee a land connection to Kaliningrad.(Ibid, pp. 343-344; HS 24.10.1997)

 
    The latest Lithuanian achievement is its border settlement with Russia of 24 October this year (1997), once again as the first of the three Baltic states. However, even though Lithuania€s only common border with Russia is with Kaliningrad to the West, the settlement was not an easy one. Only a month before the agreement the Russian Duma was against a settlement, because it meant giving up Russia€s interest in Klaipeda, a Lithuanian town situated close to Kaliningrad. The Klaipeda region was placed under the jurisdiction of the Entente as a consequence of the Versailles Peace Treaty, but the Lithuanian government decided to annex it. On May 8, 1924 the region was handed over to Lithuania with the rights of an autonomous region. However, when Germany issued an ultimatum demanding the return of the Klaipeda region, Lithuania yielded to the pressure. So before World War II both Klaipeda (Memel) and Kaliningrad (Königsberg) belonged to Germany, but in the peace settlement Königsberg was given to the Soviet Union, whereas Memel was rendered to Lithuania. Klaipeda became an important Soviet military base following the annexation of Lithuania to the Soviet empire. Now one third of Klaipeda€s population is Russian speaking.(HS 24.10.1997; Zhuryari, Surgailis & Prikulis 1994, p. 123)

 
    Jeltsin was however able to counter the Duma and the border settlement was made, making it easier for Lithuania to seek membership in the European Union and NATO. The agreement has also been seen as a sign of the warming up of Russian-Baltic relations in general, thereby giving Estonia and Latvia hope to reach border agreements of their own with their Eastern neighbour. Another major turning point in Russian relations to its €near abroad€ in general, was the NATO top meeting in Madrid the previous summer (1997), when Poland, Hungaria and the Czech republic were invited to membership negotiations.(HS 27.8.1997; 24.10.1997; 11.11.1997)