Relations with the West

 		 
    After leaving the, from an economic and security point of view, unstable Soviet Union in 1990, the three Baltic countries looked to the West for support in these realms. As already described in the previous chapters, all three countries have reorientated their foreign economic policies in different manners, Estonia has been the most radical of the three in its reorientation of foreign trade towards the West, with approximately 40% of Estonian exports going to Finland, Sweden and Germany, and over 50% of its imports coming from Finland, Sweden and Switzerland in 1993. Latvian exports to the EC/EU constituted 27.8% of total Latvian exports, while the corresponding figure in imports was 17.3%. Lithuanian trade relations with the Western countries have been relatively smaller compared to the other two Baltic countries, since the second independence, a phenomenon comparable to the Lithuanian-Western trade during the first independence.(Prikulis 1994, pp. 87, 98-99)

 
    The leaders of the Baltic countries have expressed firm intentions to join various international and regional organizations to ensure their security. After becoming members of the United Nations, CSCE and various international institutions, both EU and NATO membership have been among their highest priorities, for economic as well as security reasons. However, Baltic membership in these organizations, especially in NATO, has been seen as problematic by the West because of Russia€s negative view of the matter. The eastern enlargement of the Western economic and security structures can be seen as an important way to erase the invisible border between Western and Eastern Europe.(Ibid, p. 89)

 
   

The EU, an Economic Union with a Security Dimension

 
    Membership in the European Union was an important foreign and economic policy priority for all three Baltic countries upon achieving independence, which can be seen in their accession to the European Union€s Phare programme already in 1992. The reasons for the interest of the Baltic states in joining the EU include both economic and security considerations. The European Union, seen as the largest economic alliance in the world, provides and will provide economic stability to its members. As the European Union has become one of the most important foreign trade partners of the Baltic countries and thereby become a significant factor in the success of transition of the Baltic economies to market economies, EU-membership naturally becomes vital for economic reasons. Of course there are other aspects of Baltic EU-membership as well, the most important being a European identity brought on by belonging to the European Union, and especially the security guarantees closely associated with this identity. For the three Baltic countries membership in the EU means leaving Russia€s sphere of interest for good.(Ibid, pp. 87-89; Tiusanen 1993, pp. 19-20)

 
    The process of acquiring EU-membership will be long and difficult, especially for the Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) now applying for membership, due to the significant gaps in their economic legislation and their unstable transition economies, compared to the vast economic legislation and stable economies of the EU countries. Though the Baltic countries membership applications were made during the latter part of 1995, with Latvia applying in October, and Estonia and Lithuania following in November and December, the road to membership was started already in 1992 with the EU€s Phare Programme, as mentioned above. In spring 1993 Agreements on Trade and Commercial and Economic cooperation with the European Union were signed by all three Baltic countries, replaced by Free Trade Agreements in July 1994. On April 12, 1995 the Baltic countries signed individual Associate Agreements (Europe Agreements) with the EU, the agreements are estimated to enter into force this year (1997).(Pautola 4/1996, pp. 21-23)

 
    The Associate Agreement is an acknowledgement of the interest of a partner country to achieve full membership in the European Union and can thus be seen as a €stepping stone€ towards membership. The agreements include general principles, such as respect for democratic principles and human rights, as well as commitment to a market economy. However, since the agreements are individual there are some specific Baltic features as well as individual differences between the agreements made with each country. The most important difference, setting Estonia in a class of her own, is that no transitional period has been needed, because Estonia has no protectionist economic measures. Both in the case of Latvia and Lithuania the agreements provide transitional periods, ending on 31 December 1999. A specific Baltic feature in Estonia€s agreement with the EU, is that both parties consider the maintenance and the development of the intra-Baltic cooperation as essential to the future prosperity and stability of the region.(Ibid, pp. 28-33)

 
    The already mentioned Phare Programme is the EU initiative to provide funding to prepare partner countries for membership by providing funds to support the process of economic transformation and the strengthening of democracy. A large part of the support in the beginning is technical know-how, but as transition proceeds the focus will be shifted towards investments to support the economical, social and physical development needed to meet the membership requirements. The three Baltic countries had by the end of 1994 received ECU 191 million in financial aid through the Phare programme. The EU has also issued the 438-page so called €White Paper€ in May 1995, providing a detailed explanation on the approximation of laws, giving an idea of the enormous amount of work to be done in order to achieve EU-membership. The greatest challanges for the three Baltic countries concerns legislation in the areas of company law, intellectual property rights and the development of financial systems as well as competition policies.(Ibid, pp. 33-37)

 
    The problem of the White Paper, according to Niina Pautola, is the division that might take place between the countries, according to their individual achievements, into €back row€ and €front row€ applicants. In reality the applicants were divided into two categories by the EU Commission in July 1997, letting Estonia join the front row, while leaving Latvia and Lithuania in the back row, though the EU earlier might have prefered to have dealt with the three Baltic countries as a single entity. The Baltic countries themselves, especially the more successful Estonia, wanted to be treated individually. The accession of Estonia to the the group starting membership negotiations from the beginning of 1998, caused great disappointment and annoyance in Latvia and Lithuania, who felt that this would draw a dividing line through the Baltic countries and leave two countries in Russia€s sphere of influence. This interpretation of matters has of course been countered by both Estonia and the European Union. However, not all members of the EU are of the same opinion as the EU Commission, while Finland wholeheartedly supports the Commission, both Sweden and Denmark want the EU to put all three Baltic countries in the first group, instead of singling out Estonia. The final composition of the first group, starting membership negotiations in 1998, will be decided by the heads of state of each member country at the EU top meeting in December 1997.(Ibid, pp. 35-38; HS 11.7.1997, 27.8.1997, 8.10.1997, 11.11.1997)

   Kirsikka Bonsdorff: I would have liked to read much more about how "Finland wholeheartedly supports the Comission". It would have been interesting to knoe your own opinions about this situation.

  Kirsikka Bonsdorff: I would have also liked to read about EU's viewpoint. How does the EU see the differences between the three Baltic states? How has the European Union reacted to the "firm intentions of joining various international and regional organizations to ensure necessary security" (see chapter 6)? Why is it important to the EU that the Baltic states join the Union? What would be - in EU's opinion - a realistic timetable for this membership process? What is Finland's official opinion about this matter? How - if at all - does Finland's viewpoint differ from the EU's or from other Nordic countries' viewpoint?

 

   

NATO or Only PfP

 
    The discussions surrounding the possible membership of the three Baltic countries in NATO has been less concrete than those of their membership in the EU. As they were not admitted, at the Madrid meeting in July 1997, among the first countries to start membership negotiations with NATO, their NATO-membership was pushed far into the unforeseeable future. The accession procedure of membership in NATO is completely different from that of EU-membership, Whereas a considerable amount of legislation is needed to attain membership in the European Union, NATO-membership does not require much legal work. But there are complications both outside, as well as within the Baltic countries to their membership in NATO. The difficulties coming from the outside arise from NATO€s historical role as an alliance against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Because of the legacy of the former Soviet empire, Russia still regards the Baltic countries as belonging to its sphere of influence and consequently views all attempts on NATO€s part to enlarge Eastward, into former Soviet territory, as hostile. The difficulty arising from within the countries themselves, is their old fashioned view of NATO as a military alliance in the old €Cold War€ sense, thus creating new dividing lines in Europe, not at all compatible with the provisions set up for NATO enlargement.(Joenniemi 1993, pp. 202-206; Aabakken 1997, p. 25; HS 11.7.1997)

 
    NATO has changed in many aspects since the end of the Cold War, most clearly seen in NATO€s Cooperation Council (NACC) and Partnership for Peace programme (PfP), both including all previous Warsaw Pact members. The PfP programme emerged during the Brussels summit in January 1994 to promote democratic control of defence forces, to allow joint planning and military exercises between partners and NATO members, as well as build joint peace keeping and humanitarian operations. The PfP was developed step by step, at first excluding combat operations, then, following the NACC€s ministerial meeting in December 1995, accepting €multi-functional€ peacekeeping. The three Baltic states have been active in taking initiatives of their own within the PfP, creating the Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT) at a meeting of the Nordic defence ministers in May 1994, and developing the Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON). This way the Baltic countries are able to get high level training and technical support from all PfP partners.(Aabakken 1997, pp. 19-23)

 
    The NACC and the PfP dimensions seem to be the essential characteristics of the new NATO, and especially the part of NATO available to the Baltic countries, but is this the NATO they envisioned and hoped to join. The three Baltic states wished to secure their independence from Russia by joining the Western military defence organization NATO, not working together with Russia, but defending itself against its former occupier. However the Baltic countries are content for now with cooperating within NATO€s framework, seeing it as a stepping stone towards full membership in the future, while NATO has the time to evolve to measure up to the new security situation in present-day Europe.(Joenniemi 1993, pp. 202-206)