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Governance Bibliography

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Article abstracts

This article examines the evolution of Irish development policy, suggesting that it illustrates significant changes in government at both national and sub-national level. It is argued that pressures for change have arisen both beyond and below the national level of administration, as a result of reforms to Structural Funding at the European Union level and the growth of community initiatives at sub-national level. The chief consequence has been a redefinition of development policy which has impacted upon the structure of government, as well as the substance and style of policy delivery. Irish development policy now embraces social as well as economic policy objectives, and its implementation relies on the cooption into the policy arena of new actors and agencies, representing different interests in the development process. As a consequence, the desgn and direction of development policy now places greater emphasis on increased negotiation, partnership and subsidiarity. The extent of the change is characterised as a move towards governance in Ireland, and by doing so, the work seeks to develop the use of this term in a comparative context.

Drawing together work in comparative politics, public administration, organization theory, and economic sociology, this article describes a distinctive form of modern policy - the "networked polity." In the networked polity, states are strongly embedded in society and pursue their objectives by operating throuhg networks of societal associations. Both state agencies and societal associations take the form of "network" or "organic" organizations - decentralized, team-based organiszations with strong lateral communication and coordination that crosses functional boundaries within and between organizations. These organizations are then linked together by means of cooperative exchange relationships around common projects. The role of the state is to empower stakeholders and facilitate cooperation among them. The concept is illustrated through an examination of regional development strategisn in Western Europe.

This article considers whether the narrative of 'governing without Government in a differentiated policy' (Rhodes 1997, p. 200) provides an accurate description of the regeneration policy networks in Yorkshire and the Humber. In doing so, it considers the role of the recently created Government Office for Yorkshire and the Humber within policy networks for both UK and EU regeneration initiatives at regional and local levels. The case studies show that while Rhodesä narrative has value in explaingin the transformation of the institutions of the Westminster model, the role of Government Office in the region has ensured that the transformation to 'governing without Governmentä is far from complete in Yorkshire and the Humber.

The rise and integration of the regional level in the European Union (EU) multi-level system threatens to overload policy-making owing to a rising number of actors, levels and different institutional settings. Based on comparative empirical research on different types of region (less developed regions vs. city-regions) in both France and Germany, it is argued that adjustments of both intergovernmental and regional structures lead to the development of a multi-level framework in which dangers of overload and malfunctions can be successfully circumvented. Concerning the intergovernmental dimension of regional development policies, it is shown that the dynamic differentiation of decision-making structures as well as a balanced mixture of different modes of governance (co-operative networks, hierarchy and competition) can provide viable escape routes from potential deadlock. However, processes of structuring multi-level governance depend to a considerable degree on the national institutional setting which may provide favourable conditions for processes of adaptation, but may also impede them.

Scandinavian local government is increasingly changing its organizational pattern away from the principles of local centralized bureaucratic control that were held sacred after the reforms of the 1960s and 1970s--reforms that made local government the building block for the welfare 'state'. Organizational fragmentation is taking place, making room for both new managerial styles similar to those of the New Public Management, featuring contracting out and similar market-like arrangements, and for democratic initiatives which place service users in command of service institutions. Such developments call for new approaches to the study of local government, approaches that take interorganizational relations more directly into account. Suggestions about such an approach are made, based on studies of intergovernmental relations. Distinctions are made between intergovernmental politics which is concerned with symbolic values linked to the status of an organization, and intergovernmental management where processes of making do are seen as most important. In spite of the managerial fashion for strategic goal-setting, it is expected that the new political actors are more interested in day-to-day results and thus challenge politicians, moving them away from the abstract goals in favour of advancing and monitoring actual accomplishments. This increases the need to understand network relations and, in turn, may yield better understanding on the part of citizens of how local politics and management works.

In the introductory article to the special issue on Comparing Networks, the editors discuss the meaning of the concept of networks in relation to other recent conceptual developments in public administration such as (neo)institutional and (neo)managerial analysis. They trace the broadly understood historical development of network analysis back to the late 1960s and early 1970s and highlight some important factors in its development up to the present-day demands placed on public administration by both globalization and decentralization. The result is organizational fragmentation. Network analysis makes it clear that people working in government and administration will have to learn to think of organization as an external, not internal activity. The prospect is that hierarchical control will be replaced by continuing processes of bargaining among interested parties within most fields of public administration.

Bulmer, Simon (1993): The governance of the European Union: A new institutionalist approach. Journal of Public Policy 13 (4), 351-380.

The analysis of European integration has tended to use a toolkit drawn from international relations. But since the revival of integration in the mid-1980s, the governance of the European Community and European Union has increasingly come to resemble that of a multi-tiered state. Accordingly, this article analyzes the governance of the European Union from a comparative public policy perspective. Using new or historical institutionalism, three levels are considered. In the first part, attention is focused on the EU's institutions and the available instruments of governance. The second part examines the analysis of governance at the policy-specific or sub-system level, and puts forward an approach based on governance regimes. The final part considers the institutional roots of the persistent, regulatory character of governance in the European Union.

A 'Babylonian' variety of policy network concepts and applications can be found in the literature. Neither is there a common understanding of what policy networks actually are, nor has it been agreed whether policy networks constitute a mere metaphor, a method, an analytical tool or a proper theory. The aim of this article is to review the state of the art in the field of policy networks. Special attention is given to the German conception of policy networks which is different from the one predominant in the Anglo-Saxon literature. While British and American scholars usually conceive policy networks as a model of state/society relations in a given issue area, German works tend to treat policy networks as an alternative form of governance to hierarchy and market. It is argued that this conception of policy networks goes beyond serving as a mere analytical tool box for studying public policymaking. Yet, both the German and the Anglo-Saxon conception of policy networks face a common challenge: first, it still remains to be systematically shown that policy networks do not only exist but are really relevant to policy-making, and second, the problem of the ambiguity of policy networks has to be tackled, as policy networks can both enhance and reduce the efficiency and legitimacy of policymaking.

A 'Babylonian' variety of policy network concepts and applications can be found in the literature. Neither is there a common understanding of what a policy networks actually is, nor has it been agreed upon whether policy networks constitute a mere metaphor, a method, an analytical tool or a proper theory. The aim of this paper is to review the state of the art in the field of policy networks and to explore their usefulness in studying European policy-making and European governance. It is argued that policy networks are more than an analytical tool box for studying these phenomena. What is so special then about policy networks? They constitute arenas for non-strategic, communicative action providing solutions for collective action problems and accounting for more efficient and legitimate policy-making. Yet, a theoretically ambitious policy network approach has to, first, show that policy networks do not only exist but are relevant for policy process and policy outcome, and second, tackle the problem of the ambiguity of policy networks, which can do both enhance and reduce the efficiency and legitimacy of policy-making.

This article analyses European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) by using a historical-materialist perspective. It seeks (i) to conceptualise aspects of the emergning realtionships between public and private patterns of authority or neoliberal governance in the European Union and the global political economy; and (ii) to trace associated pwer structures and relations in terms of their coercive and consensual (material and normative) dimension. In conclusion, the article sketches some policy alternatives to neoliberalism.

This article explores the roles of markets, states, and partnerships in economic co-ordination and considers their respective tendencies to failure. The first section addresses the growing interest in governance and seeks explanations in recent theoretical developments. The second section then asks whether the rise of the governance paradigm might also reflect fundamental shifts in economic, political and social life, such that governance will remain a key issue for a long time, or is a response to more cyclical shifts in modes of co-ordination. The third section considers the logic of 'heterarchic governance' in contrast to anarchic, ex post co-ordination through market exchange and imperative ex ante co-ordination through hierarchical forms of organization. It also offers some preliminary reflections on the nature, forms, and logic of 'governance failure'. The final section addresses the state's increasing role in 'meta-governance', that is, in managing the respective roles of these different modes of co-ordination.

The article reviews the current study of the European Union (EU), where a new agenda is emerging under the umbrella of 'new governance'. Despite its eclecticism, this agenda argues that the EU is not a state, but is a unique system of non-hierarchical, regulatory and deliberative governance. This agenda also conceptualizes the EU as sui generis, explains its development primarily by (new) institutional theory, and suggests that legitimacy is guaranteed through transparent, pareto-efficient and consensual outputs. Nevertheless, this agenda is open to criticism on empirical, methodological, theoretical and normative levels. Such a dialectic suggests a new duality in the study of the EU: between the new governance approach, and a less developed rival agenda, which treats EU politics and government as not inherently unique, compares the EU to other political systems, explains outcomes through rational strategic action, and suggests that legitimacy can be guaranteed through classic democratic competition over inputs.

The model of 'autopoiesis' - originally a biological model of a living system - has stimulated some outstanding social and administrative scientists to creative thinking about possible implications and applications. In this paper, the applicability of the model to the science of (public) administration is discussed. Applying a natural scientific model to a social science is hazardous. The paper begins with a description of the original model and a discussion of its systems theoretical implications. Next a review of the various interpretations of autopoiesis in different fields of the social sciences is presented. Finally an attempt is made to perform a careful translation and cautious application. The autopoiesis model seems to offer new insights into the self-governance of organizations. The model opens a fundamentally different perspective on the relationship between organization and environment. From an organization science point of view the model seems intriguing enough to have a close look at it.

Klijn, Eerik-Hans - Joop Koppenjan - K. Termeer (1995): Managing networks in the public sector: A theoretical study of management strategies in policy networks. Public Administration 73 (3), 437-454.

Public policy usually develops in complex networks of public, quasi-public and private organizations. It is now generally accepted that these networks set limits to the governance capability of the administration. A good deal less is known about the opportunities which policy networks offer for tackling social and administrative problems. This article deals with the way network management enables government organizations to benefit from networks. Building on the theoretical concepts of 'networks' and 'games', two forms of network management are identified: game management and network structuring. Four key aspects can be identified for both of these management forms: actors and their relations, resources, rules and perceptions. At the same time, criteria for the assessment and improvement of network management are exmined. The article concludes with a consideration of the limits of network management.

Current western aid and development policy aims to promote 'good governance' in the third world. Few would deny that competent, open and fair administration is both a worthy aim and a self-evident requirement of development. However, the current orthodoxy clearly illustrates the technicist fallacy, which is implicit in the following quotation from Pope, that the effective administration or 'management' of development is essentially a technical or practical matter. This article argues that development is fundamentally a political matter and that it is illusory to conceive of good governance as independent of the forms of politics and type of state which alone can generate, sustain and protect it.

Multi-organizational partnerships are now an important means of governing and managing public programmes. They typically involve business, community and not-for-profit agencies alongside government bodies. Partnerships are frequently contrasted with competitive markets and bureaucratic hierarchies. A more complex reality is revealed once partnerships as an organizational form are distinguished from networks as a mode of social co-ordination or governance. Data from studies of UK urban regeneration partnerships are used to develop a four-stage partnership life cycle: pre-partnership collaboration; partnership creation; partnership programme delivery; and partnership termination. A different mode of governance-network, market or hierarchy--predominates at each stage. Separating organizational form from mode of governance enables a richer understanding of multiorganizational activity and provides the basis from which theory and practice can be developed. The key challenge for partnerships lies in managing the interaction of different modes of governance, which at some points will generate competition and at other points collaboration.

Since the late 1970s European governments have been forced to change their traditional modes of governance in response to such trends as increasing international competition and deepening economic and monetary integration within the European Union. Strategic adaptation to the new realities has resulted in a reduced role for the positive, interventionist state and a corresponding increase in the role of the regulatory state: rule making is replacing taxing and spending. The paper's first part identifies three sets of strategies leading to the growth of the regulatory state as external or market regulator, and as internal regulator of decentralised administration. The second part examines major structural changes induced by changes in regulatory strategies. The institutional and intellectual legacy of the interventionist state is a major impediment to the speedy adjustment of governance structures to new strategies. It would be unwise to underestimate the difficulties of the transition from the positive to the regulatory state, but it is important to realise that international competition takes place not only among producers of goods and services but also, increasingly, among regulatory regimes. Regulatory competition will reward regimes in which institutional innovations do not lag far behind the new strategic choices.

This article takes initial setps in evaluating contending models of EU governance. We argue that the sovereignty of individual states is diluted in the European arena by collective decision-making and by supranational institutions. In addition, European sates are losing their grip on the mediation of domestic interest representation in international relations. We make this argument along two tracks. First, we analyse the conditions under which central state executives may lose their grip on power. Next, we divide up the policy process into stages and specify which institutional rules may induce various actors to deepen EU policy-making.

The concept of governance has come to be used more commonly in the discussion of public administration, but the meaning of the term is not always clear. There is a growing body of European literature that can be characterized as "governance without government", stressing as it does the importance of networks, partnerships, and markets (especially international markets). This body of literature can be realated to the new public management; yet it has a number of distinctive elements. This article discusses the strengths and weaknesses of this literature and its applicability to public administration in the United States.

Local governments in Western Europe have become increasingly involved in network building with the local business community. The author suggests that governance processes are not value neutral but reflect and sustain political values beyond partisan conflict. Comparing managerial, corporatist, progrowth, and welfare governance models of urban governance, the author argues that nation-state factors play an important role in shaping urban governance. Different sectors in urban politics display different models of governance and local political choice matters. Also, cities within the same national context differ significantly with regard to the degree of inclusion of organized interests in urban governance, which, in turn, is reflected in urban policy outcomes.

The "new institutionalism" in rational choice and historical analysis are being applied with increasing sophistication and accuracy to the study of European Community governance. The basic premise of such institutional approaches is that EC institutions, once created, "take on a life of their own," acting as independent or intervening variables between the preferences and power of the member governments on the one hand, and the ultimate policy outputs of EC governance on the other. The challenge of institutionalist theory consists in constructing a precise analytical tool-box that will allow us to make specific predictions about the ways in which, and the conditions under which, EC institutions may exert such an independent causal influence. EC institutions matter, I suggest, insofar as they: lend stability to an existing institutional structure; shape any subsequent amendment of those institutions; allow individual member governments to be outvoted by qualified majority; cause member states to lose control of events through lock-ins; and subject member governments to the actions of supranational agents whose behavior they can control only imperfectly.

The term 'governance' is popular but imprecise. It has at least six uses, referring to: the minimal state; corporate governance; the new public management; 'good governance'; socio-cybernetic systems; and self-organizing networks. I stipulate that governance refers to 'self-organizing, interorganizational networks' and argue these networks complement markets and hierarchies as governing structures for authoritatively allocating resouces and exercising control and co-ordination. I defend this definition, arguing that it throws new light on recent changes in British government, most notably: hollowing out of the state, the new public management, and intergovernmental management. I conclude that networks are now a pervasive feature of service delivery in Britain; that such networks are characterized by trust and mutual adjustment and undermine management reforms rooted in competition; and that they are a challenge to governability because they become autonomous and resist central guidance.

Governance at international and global levels is not only provided through states and markets but also through a variety of private organizations. The business world is well represented through this kind of organization and cotributes to global governance through self-regulation across a number of industries. This article examines these efforts in the encompassing organization of global commerce, in the pharmaceutical industry and among dye stuffs procedures. Smaller organizations are generally better suited to monitor compliance and impose sanctions on members violating the codes and norms behind self-regulation. Even small organizations, however, are confronted with problems and there is also evidence of large and very complex organizations having established effective mechanisms as alternatives to public regulations. These experiences can be built into theories on self-regulation as a form of global governance.

In the post-war decades, advanced capitalist economies have developed in symbiosis with democratic political systems with a high capacity for effective regulation and welfare-state compensations. As economic integration deepens globally and even more sowithin the European Community, national capacities to regulate and to tax mobile capital and firms are reduced, whereas governance at European or international levels is constratined by conflicts of interest among the governments involved. Nevertheless, as the contributions to this volume show, the effectiveness of problem-solving at the national as well as at the European and international levels varies considerably from one field to another. In this introduction, I attempt to identify the fadtors that could explain the varying intensity and direction of competitive presssures on national regulatory systems, as well as the greater or lesser political feasibility of European or international regulation.

We argue that European integration is provoked and sustained by the development of causal connections between three factors: transnational exchange, supranational organization, and European Community (EC) rule-making. We explain the transition, in any given policy sector, from national to intergovernmental to supranational governance, in two ways. First cross-border transactions and communications generate a social demand for EC rules and regulation, which supranational organizations work to supply. We thus expect that Community competences will be unevenly constructed, both across policy sectors and over time, as a function of the intensity of these demands. Second, once EC rules are in place, a process of institutionalization ensues, and this process provokes further integration. Although we recognise the importance of intergovernmental bargaining in EC politics, our theory is not compatible with existing intergovernmental theorizing.

This article takes seriously the proposition that ideas and concepts, both good and bad, have an impact on international public policy. It situates the emergence of governance, good governance and global governance, as well as the UN's role in the conceptual process. Although 'governance' is as old as human history, this essay concentrates on the intellectual debates of the 1980s and 1990s but explores such earlier UN-related ideas as decolonisation, localisation and human rights, against which more recent thinking has been played out. A central analytical perspective is the tension between many academics and international practitioners who employ 'governance' to connotate a complex set of structures and processes, both public and private, while more popular writers tend to use it synonymously with 'government'.